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A Political Solution to the Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka 
The ethnic conflict between the Sinhalese 
majority and the Tamil minority in Sri 
Lanka began in the mid-1950s, yet little 
progress has been made at the negotiat- 
ing table to settle their differences on the 
issues of regional autonomy for Tamil 
areas, colonization and economic devel- 
opment of Tamil-dominated districts. 
The military confrontation between the 
Tamil militants and government forces, 
which accelerated with the anti-Tamil 
riots of 1983, has resulted in a de facto 
separation of the island into a Sinhalese 
majority region and a Tamil majority re- 
gion. Whatever impact the Tamil mili- 
tant movement has on the geopolitics of 
Sri Lanka and South Asia, its activities 
are largely confined to a well defined 
region in the North-East Province where 
the Tamil-speaking people are in the ab- 
solute majority. When the Indian Peace- 
Keeping Force (IPKF) was deployed in 
the North-East Province, only Tamil 
majority areas were under the direct su- 
pervision of the IPKF, while the Sinhalese 
majority areas in that province remained 
largely under the control of Sri Lankan 
security forces. 
Large portions of rural sections of the 
Tamil majority region continued to re- 
main under LTTE control when the war 
between the government security forces 
and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE) resumed in June 1990. By late 
1990, govemment forces attempted to 
bring the Northern Province under their 
control by launching attacks on key 
towns along the main routes leading to 
the Jaffna Peninsula, the militant strong- 
hold. At the outset, the security forces 
attempted a three-pronged attack on the 
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Jaffna Peninsula from the mainland. 
They encountered major setbacks along 
the routes, especially in Vavuniya and 
Kokkavil, and had to change their origi- 
nal strategy. Instead of gaining control of 
the main roads leading to the peninsula 
from the mainland, they strengthened 
their positions around the peninsula, in- 
cluding the Elephant Pass and the is- 
lands to the west. 
By controlling the land and sea entry 
points to the Jaffna Peninsula, the army 
sealed it off from the mainland and pre- 
vented the LTTE from moving freely 
between the two locations. Tamil Nadu 
has been virtually sealed off from the 
Jaffna Peninsula, after the Indian gov- 
ernment moved a number of ships into 
the Pak Straits to patrol the Indian coast 
and enforced strict security measures to 
prevent militants from entering or leav- 
ing. A high-ranking LTTE leader, 
Sathasivam Krishnakumar (alias Kittu), 
lost his life on January 16, 1993 while 
attempting to reach the Jaffna Peninsula 
by sea.' The army hopes to defeat the 
LTTE and to find a political solution to 
the ethnic problem by blockading the 
Jaffna peninsula, besieging it by launch- 
ing attacks from land, sea and air. 
There are no indications, however, 
that the security forces have complete 
control over the Northern Province or 
over most of the rural areasin the Eastern 
Province. Although they control the 
town of Vavuniya, the surrounding ar- 
eas are under the controlof militants. The 
army has already cut off food supplies, 
electric power and gasoline to the penin- 
sula. It also intends to isolate the LTTE 
from the one million civilians of the re- 
gionby mounting massive attacks on the 
Peninsula, using its air and artillery 
power. There is little doubt that these 
military tactics will only result in the kill- 
ing of thousands of Tamil civilians, since 
is it impossible to isolate LTTE hide-outs 
from civilian settlements, especially be- 
cause the peninsula, with its closely knit 
settlements, tall fences and market gar- 
dens, is very densely populated. While 
the security forces may succeed in inflict- 
ing heavy losses on the local population 
and the militants by attacking from the 
air and sea, they would face tough resist- 
ance from the militants on land. Indeed, 
there will be heavy losses on both sides if 
the attack were on land. It is not known 
what military strategy the army will ulti- 
mately adopt to launch its final assault 
on the Jaffna Peninsula, but it is safe to 
state that the odds of the Sri Lankan gov- 
ernment defeating a guerrilla army, 
which has the support of the population 
of the peninsula, is doubtful. A massive 
assault on the peninsula will result in the 
genocide of the Tamils. 
The govemment cannot, however, 
prolong this war because it costs thou- 
sands of dollars to maintain and supply 
the troops every day. The World Bank, 
the International Monetary Fund and 
donor countries have shown reluctance 
to furnish additional loans to Sri Lanka 
unless a real effort is made to put an end 
to the ethnic problem. 
In addition, international pressure 
from human rights groups, including the 
UN Subcommittee on Human Rights 
and donor countries, may eventually 
compel Sri Lanka to halt human rights 
violations and find a solution to the eth- 
nicconflict. Therefore, the future of peace 
in Sri Lanka and government's military 
operations in the North will depend on 
how fast it will respond to international 
pressure, both on the questions on hu- 
man rights violations and on the use of 
borrowed money to fight the militants. 
At this stage, there are no signs that the 
army or the LlTE is willing to cease hos- 
tilities and to find a political settlement to 
the conflict. Nevertheless, there are indi- 
cations, given the statements made re- 
cently by the LTTE leader, Veluppillai 
Prabhakaran, in an interview to the Brit- 
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ish Broadcasting Corporation, that the 
militants may be willing to negotiate a 
political settlement if the Sinhalese- 
dominated government was willing to 
amend the constitution to grant semi- 
regional autonomy in order to the Tamil- 
majority region, under a full-fledged 
federal system of governmenL2 
Since the ethnic composition of the 
Eastern province where Tamil, 
Sinhalese and Muslim populations are 
equally divided, is so complex, it is im- 
possible to find a lasting political solu- 
tion to the ethnic problem even under a 
federal system of government. Moreo- 
ver, the Sinhala majority willnot accept a,  
situation in which the LlTE is given the 
complete control of the North-East 
Province under a federal system of gov- 
ernment, which includes many 
Sinhalese-majority divisions. This does 
not imply that the LTTE and the Sri 
Lankan forces have no alternative but to 
fight it out to the bitter end because many 
thousands of civilians will lose their lives 
in such a protracted war. It is also un- 
likely that the people who have been 
directly or indirectly affected by the vio- 
lence of the past and present will return 
to the devastated areas of Trincornalee, 
Vavuniya and Amparai and live peace- 
fully in areas of ethnically mixed 
neighborhoods. Indeed, given the recent 
events in eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union, there is little hope that 
communal harmony can be restored in 
ethnically mixed-conflict zones in Sri 
Lanka. 
One possible solution to the ethnic 
conflict in Sri Lanka is to readjust the 
boundaries of the North-East Province, 
which were drawn during the British 
colonial period. Ethnic harmony can be 
restored in theNorth-East Province if the 
western boundary of the Eastern Prov- 
ince can be adjusted to exclude the As- 
sistant Government Agent's (AGA) 
divisions that are Sinhalese-majority di- 
visions. The Tamil majority could be 
given political control of the eastern two- 
thirds of the Eastern Province, while the 
rest of the province would be annexed to 
Sinhalese provinces. It is imperative, 
given the mistrust that the members of 
the major communities have of each 
other, that Tamil-speaking people and 
Sinhalese should be given the opportu- 
nity to live in clearly defined, separate 
AGA divisionsin theEastemProvince.If 
these readjustments to the boundary of 
the Eastern Province were accompanied 
with the establishment of a full-fledged 
federal system of government for the is- 
land, the members of the L'ITE may be 
willing to enter into the political main- 
stream. Tamil militants have called upon 
the government to halt the policy of colo- 
nizing Sinhalese in Tamil areas because 
they fear that the govemment will carve 
out more Sinhalese electorates, in addi- 
tion to the existent Amparai and 
Seruwila electorates. The LTTE became 
belligerent when thegovernment openly 
challenged it by attempting to settle 
fixed quota of Sinhalese to settle in Tamil 
districts is not going to end the ethnic 
conflict. Most of the violent incidentsin- 
volving brutal killings of civilians by 
government forces and Tamil militants 
have occurred in Tamil majority AGA 
divisions rather than in the Sinhalese 
majority AGA divisions of Eastern Prov- 
ince. Moreover, the Tamil majority AGA 
divisions, which have been increasingly 
targeted for Sinhalese colonization since 
1983, have generated most of the refu- 
gees in the Eastern Province. 
It is feasible to preserve the territorial 
integrity of Tamil majority AGA divi- 
sions under a federal system of govern- 
ment by redefining the boundaries of the 
North-East Province using the 1981 Cen- 
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Sinhalese peasants in the Mullaitivu and 
Batticaloa districts, via the Maduru Oya 
and Vali- Oya projects, during the 1980s. 
This hostile behaviour of the militants 
against the government is motivated by 
their desue to preserve their Tamil tradi- 
tional homeland and the distinct identity 
of the Tamil-speaking people. They are 
also concerned that if Sinhalese settle- 
ment of Tamil areas goes unchecked, the 
political power of the Tamils will ulti- 
matelybe undermined. Tothem, the only 
solution to end Sinhalese colonization of 
Tamil-speaking areas has been and con- 
tinues to be the creation of a separate 
Tamil state. I have suggested in a previ- 
ous study that the problem of coloniza- 
tion can be resolved by redefining the 
limits of the North-East Province so that 
Sinhalese majority areas, rather than 
Tamil-majority areas in the North-East 
Province, would become the focus of 
Sinhalese colonization? More than any 
other factor, land settlement policy of the 
government has contributed to the esca- 
lation of the ethnic conflict since the early 
1980s. Indeed, the ethnic conflict cannot 
be resolved unless the problem of coloni- 
zation is solved to the satisfaction of both 
Sinhalese and Tamils. Allowing for a 
sus data on population.' Likewise, un- 
der a federal system of government, 
Sinhalese citizens who are long time resi- 
dents of the Tamil-speaking majority re- 
gion would continue to reside in the area. 
Sinhalese who are not sponsored under 
government-funded colonization 
schemes could settle in the Tamil-speak- 
ing majority region. Spontaneous migra- 
tion of Sinhalese into the Tamil-speaking 
majority region would be similar to the 
migration of hundreds of Tamil-speak- 
ing people into the Sinhalese-speaking 
majority region on a voluntary basis. 
Thousands of Tamils have taken tempo- 
rary refuge in Colombo because it is no 
longer safe to reside in the war-tom 
Tamil majority districts. Indeed, indi- 
vidually funded Tamil migration into 
Sinhalese areas has not resulted in the 
creation of a Tamil electorate in Sinhalese 
areas. On the other hand, government- 
sponsored colonization of Sinhalese 
peasants in the north and east has con- 
tributed to the creation of Sinhalese elec- 
torates in the North-East Province. 
Sinhalese continue to maintain an abso- 
lute majority in all the districts in the 
Sinhalese majority region, except in the 
central and south central parts of the 
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country, where Tamils of Indian origin 
were settled by the British in the nine- 
teenth century. Unless tangible solutions 
are found to resolve these problems, 
there cannot be any peace in the island. 
To contain Sinhalese colonization to 
the Assistant Government Agent's divi- 
sions in which the Sinhalese have an ab- 
solute majority, the boundaries of the 
North-East Province should be redrawn 
so that Sinhalese majority AGA divisions 
will be detached from the North-East 
Province and annexed to the North Cen- 
tral and Uva Provinces. The AGA divi- 
sions that would be annexed to the 
North-Central and Uva Rovinces under 
this plan are Padawi Siripura, 
Gomarankadawala, Morawewa, West- 
ern one-third of Thampalagamam, 
Kantalai, Padiyatalawa, Mahaoya, 
Uhana, Damana, Lahugala and 
Vavuniya South (Sinhalese)? 
Sinhalese population in these divi- 
sions, is between 82.5 percent and 99.4 
percent of the total, except for 
Morawewa and Thampalagamam, 
where the Sinhalese population is 55 per- 
cent and 31.4 percent, respectively. Nev- 
ertheless, Morawewa and the western 
one-third of Thampalagamam, which 
had approximately 11,654 Sinhalese in 
1981, can become part of the Sinhalese- 
speaking majority region. This would 
make it feasible for Seruwila, where the 
Sinhalese population is 57.7 percent of 
the total population, tobeanintegral part 
of the Tamil-speaking majority region. 
Under this arrangement, the 11,654 
Sinhalese from the Morawewa and 
Thampalagamam AG A divisions would 
become part of the Sinhalese-speaking 
majority region, while the 11,665 
Sinhalese of the Seruwila AGA division 
would remain in the redefined North- 
East Province. The Seruwila and 
Kuchchaveli AGA divisions would fur- 
nish the linkage between the northern 
and southern Tamil-speaking majority 
areas of the North-East Province. Tamil 
leaders insist that this linkage must be 
maintained if there is to be lasting peace 
in Sri Lanh6 
By redrawing the boundaries of the 
North-East Province, the ethnic compo- 
sition of the Tamil-speaking majority re- 
gion wouldbe altered. The reconstituted 
Figure 1: Districts of Sri Lanka (Source: see note 6) 
Tamil-majority region would contain 
94.9 percent Tamil-speaking people ac- 
cording to the 1981 census (see Figure 1). 
The rights of the Muslim minority in the 
redefined Tamil majority region could 
be guaranteed by enacting legislation 
and by devolving legislative and execu- 
tive powers to the district councils, which 
should be established in areas where the 
Muslims are in the majority. Given the 
fact that Sinhalese leaders mistrust Tamil 
leaders and vice versa, it might be neces- 
sary for the Sri Lankan government and 
the leaders of the LlTE to agree on a list 
of foreign countries that canbe invited to 
participate in the peace process. It might 
even be necessary for an international 
organization l i e  the United Nations to 
settle theissue of theboundary of a newly 
reconstituted North-East Province and 
to maintain ethnic harmony along the 
readjusted boundary. 
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